Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy higher profits if: each firm simultaneously increased output above the Nash equilibrium level. the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level. each firm simultaneously increased prices above the Nash equilibrium level.

Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy higher profits if: each firm simultaneously increased output above the Nash equilibrium level. the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level. each firm simultaneously increased prices above the Nash equilibrium level.

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter10: Monopolistic Competition And Oligoply

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 20SQ: The kinked oligopoly demand curve is a result of the assumption by an oligopolist that a. price...

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Question

Both firms in a Cournot duopoly would enjoy higher profits if:

		each firm simultaneously increased output above the Nash equilibrium level.
		the firms simultaneously reduced output below the Nash equilibrium level.
		each firm simultaneously increased prices above the Nash equilibrium level.
		one firm reduced output below the Cournot Nash equilibrium level, while the other firm continued to produce its Cournot Nash equilibrium output.

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