Consider the following version or the linear Cournot duopoly model. The market price, P is determined by (inverse) market demand: P =1- Q if Q<1, P = 0 otherwise Each firm decides on the quantity to sell (market share): q1 and q2. Q = q1 + q2 total market demand. Both firms seek to maximize profits. There are no fixed costs. The marginal cost of producing each unit of the good: c1 and c2. c1 is common knowledge and equal to , however c2 is known only by firm 2. Firm 1 believes that c2 is 'high" c = } with probability and 'low' c = 0 with probability . Firm l’s belief about firm 2's cost is common knowledge Find the pure strategy Bayes Nash Equilibrium and compare it to the situation in which the cost of firm 2 is common knowledge. Does firm 2 have an incentive to reveal her cost when it is low? When it is high? What do you conclude?

Microeconomic Theory
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ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
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Chapter15: Imperfect Competition
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Cournot competition with incomplete information - game theory.

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Consider the following version or the linear Cournot duopoly model. The market price, P is determined by
(inverse) market demand:
P = 1- Q if Q< 1, P = 0 otherwise
Each firm decides on the quantity to sell (market share): q1 and q2. Q = q1 + q2 total market demand.
Both firms seek to maximize profits. There are no fixed costs. The marginal cost of producing each unit of
the good: c1 and c2. c1 is common knowledge and equal to , however c2 is known only by firm 2. Firm
1 believes that c2 is 'high" c = i with probability and 'low' c = 0 with probability . Firm l's belief
about firm 2's cost is common knowledge
Find the pure strategy Bayes Nash Equilibrium and compare it to the situation in which the cost of firm
2 is common knowledge. Does firm 2 have an incentive to reveal her cost when it is low? When it is high?
What do you conclude?
Transcribed Image Text:Consider the following version or the linear Cournot duopoly model. The market price, P is determined by (inverse) market demand: P = 1- Q if Q< 1, P = 0 otherwise Each firm decides on the quantity to sell (market share): q1 and q2. Q = q1 + q2 total market demand. Both firms seek to maximize profits. There are no fixed costs. The marginal cost of producing each unit of the good: c1 and c2. c1 is common knowledge and equal to , however c2 is known only by firm 2. Firm 1 believes that c2 is 'high" c = i with probability and 'low' c = 0 with probability . Firm l's belief about firm 2's cost is common knowledge Find the pure strategy Bayes Nash Equilibrium and compare it to the situation in which the cost of firm 2 is common knowledge. Does firm 2 have an incentive to reveal her cost when it is low? When it is high? What do you conclude?
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