Suppose the supply curve of motorized scooter rentals in Golden Gate Park is given by:P = 5 + 0.1Q,where P is the daily rent per unit in dollars and Q is the volume of units rented in hundreds per day. The demand curve for motorizedscooters is:P=20 -0.2Q.If each motorized scooter imposes $2.10 per day in noise costs on others, by how much will the equilibrium number of motorizedscooters rented exceed the socially optimal number?units (in hundreds).

Find the Equilibrium Price and Quantity:Set the supply (P) equal to the demand (P) to find the…

Answered: Suppose the supply curve of motorized…

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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Suppose the government is considering an increase in the toll on a certain stretch of highway from $.20 to $.40. At present, 80,000 cars per week use that highway stretch; after the toll is imposed, it is projected that only 75,000 cars per week will use the highway stretch. Assuming that the marginal cost of highway use is constant (i.e., the supply schedule is horizontal) and equal to $.20 per car, what is the change in social surplus attributable to the increase in the toll? (Hint: The toll increase will cause the supply schedule, not the demand schedule, to shift.) Calculate government revenues from the increased toll. A. $18,750 B. $37,500 C. $15,000 D. $1000
Consider an urban highway that is subject to traffic congestion. The average cost of travel per mile on that highway is (in cents): AC= 10 + 4T, where Tis traffic volume per hour, measured in 100s of vehicles per hour. For example, if T = 500 cars per hour, AC = 30 cents per mile. Assume that the demand for traffic per hour (during rush hour) is T = 46 – P, where P is the "price" paid by the driver. а. Assume that no congestion toll is imposed. Compute equilibrium T and P. b. Assume that it is possible to impose the efficient congestion toll. Find the toll, and the efficient levels of T, P, and AC.
Assume that the demand function for tuna in a small coastal town is given by 140 p = (200 < q < 800), q0.5 where p is the price (in dollars) per pound of tuna, and q is the number of pounds of tuna that can be sold at the price p in one month. (a) Calculate the price (in $ per Ib) that the town's fishery should charge for tuna in order to produce a demand of 400 pounds of tuna per month. per Ib (b) Calculate the monthly revenue R (in dollars) as a function of the number of pounds of tuna q. R(q) = (c) Calculate the revenue and marginal revenue (derivative of the revenue with respect to q) at a demand level of 400 pounds per month. revenue marginal revenue per Ib of tuna Interpret the results. At a demand level of 400 pounds per month, the revenue is $ and increasing at a rate of $ per additional pound of tuna.
A steel mill, S, produces 20 tons of water pollution for every 100 tons of steel it produces. The downstream village of Watertown (WT) spends $150 per ton of water pollution from S to eliminate itsenvironmental harm. S is a price taker in an international market where the demand for steel is p = 100 – 3X and the market supply of steel is p = 40 + 3X. X is in units of one (1) million tons per day and p is the price in dollars per ton of steel. S has a daily increasing marginal cost of production function, MC = x.S's Total Cost function = x*x/2 where x is S’s daily output.(a) If S has no legal liability for its pollution, what is S’s daily production of steel?How does your answer here relate to the concept of private efficiency?(b) WT wants to bargain with S to reach an optimal agreement on this pollution. Assuming S is still not legally liable for its pollution and both S and WT do not use lawyers, would there be an agreement? How does your answer here relate the concept of private…
A steel mill, S, produces 20 tons of water pollution for every 100 tons of steel it produces. The downstream village of Watertown (WT) spends $150 per ton of water pollution from S to eliminate its environmental harm . S is a price taker in an international market where the demand for steel is p = 100 – 3X and the market supply of steel is p = 40 + 3X. X is in units of one (1) million tons per day and p is the price in dollars per ton of steel. S has a daily increasing marginal cost of production function, MC = x. S's Total Cost function = x*x/2 where x is S’s daily output. (a) If S has no legal liability for its pollution, what is S’s daily production of steel? How does your answer here relate to the concept of private efficiency? (b) WT wants to bargain with S to reach an optimal agreement on this pollution. Assuming S is still not legally liable for its pollution and both S and WT do not use lawyers, would there be an agreement? How does yo ur answer here relate the concept of…
Imagine a firm with a marginal abatement cost (MAC) function equal to: MAC = 32 - 4E. The government offers a $8 per-unit subsidy for abatement. In principle, the firm could ignore the subsidy and continue to emit as many emissions as it was in the absence of government intervention, but there is money to be made from cutting back its emissions. Compared to ignoring the subsidy, how much money could a cost-minimizing firm save or make by cutting back its emissions? (Hint: remember that firms trade off the benefits of the subsidy with the costs of abatement when deciding how much to abate) Answer:
Suppose the supply curve of portable radio rentals in Golden Gate Park is given by: P = 5 + 0.1Q, where P is the daily rent per unit in dollars and Q is the volume of units rented in hundreds per day. The demand curve for portable radios is: P=20-0.2Q. If each portable radio imposes $3.60 per day in noise costs on others, by how much will the equilibrium number of portable radios rented exceed the socially optimal number? units (in hundreds).
The New York state government is trying to build a massive dam that may obscure scenic views of the Hudson River. Assume the state government is trying to decide how many miles of the river it should preserve. The community that would be affected includes 200 people, each of whom has an identical inverse demand function represented by P= 30-3q, where q is the number of miles preserved and P is the per-mile price the community member is willing to pay for q miles of preserved river a. If the marginal cost of preservation is $600 per mile, how many miles would be preserved in an efficient allocation? b. What is the size of the economic surplus?
Imagine a firm's marginal abatement cost function with existing technologies is: MAC = 30 – 2E. If the firm adopts new pollution abatement technologies, its marginal abatement cost function will be: MAC = 15 – E. With a tax on emissions of $6, the benefits of adopting the new technologies are $_ Answer:
In the market for used cars, the demand and supply equations are given by Qd= 12,000 - 0.4P and Qs= 0.1P + 5,000, where P is the price per car and Q measures the quantity of cars. What is the size of the deadweight loss at a price floor of 15,000?
A study finds that the noise from lawn mowers is harmful; hence, the government imposes a $25 tax on the sale of every lawn mower. This amount accurately accounts for the external cost of the noise pollution. Before the corrective tax, basic push mowers regularly sold for $190. After the tax is in place, the market price for basic push mowers rises to $208. Because of the tax, the number of basic push mowers sold will .The socially optimal price of basic push mowers is $ .The private market price is $ .A firm selling basic push mowers receives $ after it pays the tax.
Suppose that a chemical manufacturing plant is releasing nitrogen oxides into the air, and these emissions are associated with health and ecological damages. Economists have estimated the following marginal costs and benefits for the chemical market, where Q is monthly output in thousands of pounds and P is price per pound. MSB = 50 – 0.4Q; MSC = 2 + 0.4Q; MEB = 0; MEC = 0.2Q. Find the dollar value of a product charge that would achieve an efficient solution.

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