Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargell and Schmidt choose to work together. PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 MR 80 160 240 320 400 480 560 640 MC = ATC 720 800 Monopoly Outcome

Stargell and Schmidt are brewing companies that operate in a duopoly (two-firm oligopoly). The daily marginal cost (MC) of producing a can of beer is constant and equals $0.80 per can. Assume that neither firm had any startup costs, so marginal cost equals average total cost (ATC) for each firm. Suppose that Stargell and Schmidt form a cartel, and the firms divide the output evenly. (Note: This is only for convenience; nothing in this model requires that the two companies must equally share the output.) Place the black point (plus symbol) on the following graph to indicate the profit-maximizing price and combined quantity of output if Stargell and Schmidt choose to work together. PRICE (Dollars per can) 2.00 1.80 1.60 Demand 1.40 1.20 1.00 0.80 0.60 0.40 0.20 0 0 MR 80 160 240 320 400 480 560 640 MC = ATC 720 800 Monopoly Outcome

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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