QUESTION 13Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given byD₁(P₁, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2and demand for firm 2's product isD2 (P1, P2)140 - 2p2 + P1Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20.What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1?(Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)

A situation in which each player in a game is making the best choice feasible given the choices of…

QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P1, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2(P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P₁ Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)

QUESTION 13 Consider a market where two firms (1 and 2) produce differentiated goods and compete in prices. The demand for firm 1 is given by D₁(P1, P2) = 140 - 2p1 + P2 and demand for firm 2's product is D2(P1, P2) 140 - 2p2 + P₁ Both firms have a constant marginal cost of 20. What is the Nash equilibrium price of firm 1? (Only give a full number; if necessary, round to the lower integer; no dollar sign.)

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.3P

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