payoff

Microeconomic Theory
12th Edition
ISBN:9781337517942
Author:NICHOLSON
Publisher:NICHOLSON
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.9P
icon
Related questions
Question
1. Use the following game tree to answer parts a & b. At a chance node (Nature's turn) or
when a player is indifferent between strategies, each branch has equal likelihood (50%
chance they take either path). Nature receives no payoff. Assume players are mistake
proof. Use a complete strategy when discussing the results of this game and provide a
payoff, even if that payoff is an expected one. Recall that an expected payoff is the
"average" payoff: for example if with 50% chance we receive a payoff of 5 and with 50%
chance we receive a payoff of 2, the expected payoff is .5 x 5+ .5 x 2 = 3.5
a. What is the outcome of the game? Assume players are risk neutral (i.e., they see no
difference in getting a payoff of 5 vs an expected payoff of 5).
Red 0, 1, 3, 3
3, 2, 3, 2
Dorothy
Blue
Top
1, 4, 3, 2
Scarecrow
50%
Green
Nature
Right
Bottom
0, 2, 3, 1
Lion
50%
1, 3, 4, 2
3, 4, 3, 2
50%
Left
Nature
3, 2, 1, 2
Up
50%
Red.
1, 3, 4, 2
Down
Tinman
Blue
0, 3, 3, 3
Yellow
Dorothy
4, 3, 4, 2
Equilibrium:
b. Let's say Scarecrow is a gambler. By this I mean he prefers having a chance at a good or
bad outcome vs a guarantee (for example, he'd take a 50-50 shot at 10 vs. 0 vs just a
guaranteed payoff of 5, even though both have the same expected payoff). Even if
Scarecrow wasn't a gambler, would it be beneficial to him to pretend to be?
Transcribed Image Text:1. Use the following game tree to answer parts a & b. At a chance node (Nature's turn) or when a player is indifferent between strategies, each branch has equal likelihood (50% chance they take either path). Nature receives no payoff. Assume players are mistake proof. Use a complete strategy when discussing the results of this game and provide a payoff, even if that payoff is an expected one. Recall that an expected payoff is the "average" payoff: for example if with 50% chance we receive a payoff of 5 and with 50% chance we receive a payoff of 2, the expected payoff is .5 x 5+ .5 x 2 = 3.5 a. What is the outcome of the game? Assume players are risk neutral (i.e., they see no difference in getting a payoff of 5 vs an expected payoff of 5). Red 0, 1, 3, 3 3, 2, 3, 2 Dorothy Blue Top 1, 4, 3, 2 Scarecrow 50% Green Nature Right Bottom 0, 2, 3, 1 Lion 50% 1, 3, 4, 2 3, 4, 3, 2 50% Left Nature 3, 2, 1, 2 Up 50% Red. 1, 3, 4, 2 Down Tinman Blue 0, 3, 3, 3 Yellow Dorothy 4, 3, 4, 2 Equilibrium: b. Let's say Scarecrow is a gambler. By this I mean he prefers having a chance at a good or bad outcome vs a guarantee (for example, he'd take a 50-50 shot at 10 vs. 0 vs just a guaranteed payoff of 5, even though both have the same expected payoff). Even if Scarecrow wasn't a gambler, would it be beneficial to him to pretend to be?
Expert Solution
steps

Step by step

Solved in 4 steps with 13 images

Blurred answer
Knowledge Booster
Incomplete Information
Learn more about
Need a deep-dive on the concept behind this application? Look no further. Learn more about this topic, economics and related others by exploring similar questions and additional content below.
Similar questions
  • SEE MORE QUESTIONS
Recommended textbooks for you
Microeconomic Theory
Microeconomic Theory
Economics
ISBN:
9781337517942
Author:
NICHOLSON
Publisher:
Cengage
Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
Microeconomics: Principles & Policy
Economics
ISBN:
9781337794992
Author:
William J. Baumol, Alan S. Blinder, John L. Solow
Publisher:
Cengage Learning