microeconomics help please 24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000

microeconomics help please 24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter7: The Market For Health Insurance

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11QAP

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In an insurance system, would you expect each person to receive in benefits pretty much what they pay in premiums or is it just that the average benefits paid will equal the average premiums paid?
What is an actuarially fair insurance policy?
ease use utility of wealth function in the booK, 8-1 (see below). Certainty Utility B D 200 198 194 D' Total utility 170 of wealth C' Expected Utility A 140 10,000 15,000 19,000 20,000 Wealth FIGURE 8-1 Total Utility of Wealth and the Impact of Insurance Please explain the difference between the certainty utility line and the expected utility line b. Calculate your E(U), given an 80% change of being healthy and 20% of being sick, knowing that your income falls to $10,000 and your utility is 140 if you get sick. Calculate your E(W), given an 80% change of being healthy and 20% of being sick. d. Given that your Certainty Utility Function is U = 200Y-0.00154 and Y is your income, what is your Certainty Utility with insurance (if you are risk averse) What insurance premium will you pay to guarantee a utility of 197? Please provide a calculation.
24. Consider adverse selection in the car insurance market. Drivers are either risky or safe. The insurance companies cannot distinguish between the two types of drivers, but they know that 50% of all drivers are risky. Insuring a risky driver costs $3,000, while insuring a safe driver costs $1,000. The benefits of insurance is $4,000 for a risky driver and $1,500 for a safe driver. If insurers cannot observe the type of buyer they are insuring, what is the minimum equilibrium price of insurance? a. $1,000 b. $1,500 c. $2,000 d. $3,000 e. $4,000
Moral Hasard and Insurance The utility is U = W1/2 − 350S + 95S1/2 ; where W is wealth and S is care taken to avoid accidents. Probability of accident is 0.70 − S1/2 Wealth is ✩850,000 without accident and ✩300,000 with accident. Calculate S, EU and CE without insurance. Calculate S and EU with full insurance
Nathan's income in a typical year is 75,000. There is a 10 percent chance that Nathan will be seriously ill next year, incurring 15,000 in medical expenses. Samantha also earns 75,000 in a typical year. Her chance of becoming seriously ill next year and incurring ur 15,000 in medical expenses is 20 percent. a. Calculate the actuarially fair premium for full insurance for (i) Nathan and (ii) Samantha. b. Suppose that a private insurance firm cannot distinguish between Nathan and Samantha in terms of their risk and assumes the risk of being seriously ill in the general population is 10%. In this context, discuss the adverse selection problem the firm might face. c. Can a compulsory, government - run health insurance program avoid the problem of adverse selection? Explain why or why not.
Insurance buyers have more information about whether they are high-risk or low-risk than the insurance company does. This creates an asymmetric information problem for the insurance company because buyers who are high-risk tend to want to buy more insurance, without letting the insurance company know about their higher risk. How might this problem impact an insurance company? F T O The company will not be impacted. O The insurance buyers, not the company, will be impacted. As high risk buyers submit claims, they will use up the company's funds for that year, and since the company did not adjust for these high risk claims, once that money is used up, remaining claimants won't receive any coverage. The company will be faced with heavy losses. The insurance company may decide not to sell insurance in this market at all or otherwise choose not to sell insurance to those they can identify as high risk. 106 # C 4 $ JUL 21 tv♫♬ % MacBook Pro Search or type URL + W D P N Ⓒ
For each of the following kinds of insurance, give anexample of behavior that reflects moral hazard andanother example of behavior that reflects adverseselection.a. health insuranceb. car insurancec. life insurance
A9 Describe an example of adverse selection that we may run into in the real world. How does adverse selection impact the policy holders for this specific type of insurance for: High risk participants? Low risk participants? What is one government regulation that has been enacted in the last 20 years that helps either high risk or low risk policy holders in the United States
6. Suppose that there are two types of drivers: reckless and safe. Reckless drivers have a higher probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $5000. Safe drivers have a lower probability of accidents with an expected loss to the insurance company of $1000. Insurer cannot distinguish between reckless and safe drivers but know that reckless drivers make up "B" proportion of all drivers. What single premium should the risk-neutral insurer charge? Assume that the insurance market is perfectly competitive. Is the above mentioned problem an example of Adverse Selection or Moral Hazard? Explain.
An employer needs to make a hiring decision and bring new employees on board. Some preliminary research indicated that ¼ of the pool could bring $50,000 value to the company, ¼ $60,000, ¼ $70,000, and ¼ $80,000. Assuming asymmetric information and adverse selection (you don’t know what value new employees could bring) what kind of job offer the company should consider in order to hire 4 new employees? Please explain.
1)Describe an example of moral hazard that we may run into in the real world. Think of something that is legal and not inherently lethal, yet still demonstrates elevated risk for the participant who would likely act safer if insurance or protection was not available. Explain why someone might take this risky action. What are the benefits to the risky behavior? In your response to two of your peers, explain what an insurance company may do to reduce the likelihood that an individual would take this risk. Keep in mind, that we cannot always just deny coverage if an individual is participating in the risky behavior.