Consider a Centipede game below. Player 1 moves first and he can choose either L or R. If player 1 chooses R; then Player 2 moves choosing either L or R and if he chooses R then Player 1 moves choosing either L or R and then finally player 2 moves. 1 R 2 R 1 R 2 9,9 L L L 2,0 0,4 6,2 4,8 a. Represent this game in a normal form b. Find all the Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium or equilibria c. Find all the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game

Consider a Centipede game below. Player 1 moves first and he can choose either L or R. If player 1 chooses R; then Player 2 moves choosing either L or R and if he chooses R then Player 1 moves choosing either L or R and then finally player 2 moves. 1 R 2 R 1 R 2 9,9 L L L 2,0 0,4 6,2 4,8 a. Represent this game in a normal form b. Find all the Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium or equilibria c. Find all the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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The following table contains the possible actions and payoffs of players 1 and 2. Player 1 U M D L 2,10 2,5 8,7 Player 2 C 5,2 11,8 8,4 R 5,4 2,9 8,3 This is a simultaneous move game. In a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of this game, Player 1 receives a payoff of ✓and player 2 receives a payoff of If, instead of playing simultaneously, player 2 moves first, then in the Nash equilibrium player 1 receives a payoff of ✓and player 2 receives a payoff of
Consider the following simultaneous game: Player 1 U D Player 2 L 30,10 -10, 20 R 10, 20 5,-10 Please indicate whether each of the following statements is true or false. Player 1 has a dominant strategy. This game has a Nash equilibrium. This game has a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies. Player 1's best response is D if player 2 plays R.
5. Consider the following Extended Form game where P1 stands for Player one and P2 stands for player two with A, B and A', B' being their respective strategies. A' (1,1) P2 B' (2,3) P1 A' B (4,5) P2 What is the set of Nash Equilibria? Clearly explain your answer. Full-screen Snip B' (6,7)
5. Consider a simultaneous game in which player A chooses one of two actions (Up or Down), and B chooses one of two actions (Left or Right). The game has the following payoff matrix, where the first payoff in each entry is for A and the second for B.(8 points) B Right Left 3,3 5,1 Down 2,2 4,4 a. Find the Nash equilibrium or equilibria. b. Which player, if any, has a dominant strategy? A Up
Consider the following game : Stag Rabbit Stag 9, 9 0, 8 Rabbit 8, 0 7, 7 The first payoff is that of player 1 and the second that of player 2. a. ) Draw the extensive form of the simultaneous game. Find all the Nash equilibrium. p. Suppose player 1 moves first or we are in a sequential game now. Draw the extensive form in the sequential version. c. What is the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) in the sequential version? d. ) Explain why it is an SPNE.
7. Solving for dominant strategies and the Nash equilibrium Suppose Dmitri and Frances are playing a game in which both must simultaneously choose the action Left or Right. The payoff matrix that follows shows the payoff each person will earn as a function of both of their choices. For example, the lower-right cell shows that if Dmitri chooses Right and Frances chooses Right, Dmitri will receive a payoff of 7 and Frances will receive a payoff of 6. Frances Left Right Left 4, 3 6, 4 Dmitri Right 6, 7 7, 6 to choose The only dominant strategy in this game is for and Frances chooses The outcome reflecting the unique Nash equilibrium in this game is as follows: Dmitri chooses v
Team 2 plays A Team 2 plays B Team 1 plays A 2, 1 0,0 Team 1 plays B 0,0 1, 2 Consider the game above. Which of the following is a Nash Equilibrium of the game? O Team 1 plays A two thirds of the time and plays the rest of the time, while team 2 plays A two thirds of the time and plays B the rest of the time. Team 1 plays A one quarter of the time and plays B the rest of the time, while team 2 plays A one quarter of the time and plays B the rest of the time. Team 1 plays A one quarter of the time and plays B the rest of the time, while team 2 plays A three quarters of the time and plays B the rest of the time. O None of the other answers are correct. Team 1 plays A two thirds of the time and plays B the rest of the time, while team 2 plays A one third of the time and plays B the rest of the time.
5 Suppose two players play one of the two normal-form games shown in Figure 1. L U 0,-1 D 2,4 R 2,0 6,0 L U | 4,-1 D 2,-2 R 2,0Now suppose that Player 2 knows which game is being played, but Player 1 does not. Find the pure strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium of this game.
1. Consider the game where initially She chooses between "Stay Home" and "Go Out". If She chooses "Stay Home" then She gets 2 and He gets 0. If She chooses "Go Out" then they each simultaneously choose "Movie" or "Concert" where the payoffs are 0,1 or 3 as in the Battle of the Sexes Game. What are the subgame perfect Nash Equilibria of this game ?
on 8.1 Consider the following game: Player 1 A C D 7,6 5,8 0,0 Player 2 E 5,8 7,6 1, 1 F 0,0 1,1 4,4 a. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria (if any). b. Find the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in which each player randomizes over just the first two actions. c. Compute players' expected payoffs in the equilibria found in parts (a) and (b). d. Draw the extensive form for this game.
The bimatrix represents a simultaneous move game between Rowena and Colin. Rowena's payoff is the left number in each cell. ROWENA O O 2 Calculate Rowena 's expected payoff in the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. 3.5 2.5 Up Down 3 Left 1,16 2,20 COLIN Right 4,6 3,40
Find the unique Nash equilibrium of a game with the following payoff matrix: Player 2 2 4 1 (6, 7) (13, 8) (9, 9) Player 1 3 (4, 4) (7, 7) (7, 6) (7, 7) (11, 11) (7, 13) О a. (3, 2) O b. (5, 4) О с. (11, 11) O d. (1, 6) O e. There is no unique Nash equilibrium.