5. Consider a decision-maker who expects to have a car accident with chance ; if this occurs, he will incur $L in damages. He can purchase as much auto insurance, q, as he likes, at a price of p per dollar of coverage: this means that if he pays pq upfront (as the insurance premium), he'll receive a payment of q from the insurance company if an accident occurs. (a) Write out his expected utility from purchasing insurance level q, assuming a utility-of- wealth function u(w) and initial wealth wo. 1 (b) Show that the optimal level of insurance, q, solves u' (wo - L+ (1 − p)q)) u' (wo - pq) P(1 - π) π(1-P) (c) Now assume that u(w) = 1- e-aw, where a > 0 (this is known as a "CARA", or "constant absolute risk aversion", utility function; a parametrizes risk aversion). Solve explicitly for the optimal insurance, and show that it does not depend on wealth.

5. Consider a decision-maker who expects to have a car accident with chance ; if this occurs, he will incur $L in damages. He can purchase as much auto insurance, q, as he likes, at a price of p per dollar of coverage: this means that if he pays pq upfront (as the insurance premium), he'll receive a payment of q from the insurance company if an accident occurs. (a) Write out his expected utility from purchasing insurance level q, assuming a utility-of- wealth function u(w) and initial wealth wo. 1 (b) Show that the optimal level of insurance, q, solves u' (wo - L+ (1 − p)q)) u' (wo - pq) P(1 - π) π(1-P) (c) Now assume that u(w) = 1- e-aw, where a > 0 (this is known as a "CARA", or "constant absolute risk aversion", utility function; a parametrizes risk aversion). Solve explicitly for the optimal insurance, and show that it does not depend on wealth.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.5P

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